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The Solomon Islands Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was the first TRC in the Pacific Islands. Its goals and activities – truth-seeking, reconciliation 
and the production of a report with a narrative of the conflict that focused on human rights violations – reflect the normative values of global transitional jus-
tice discourses. In this paper I draw on interviews with former staff of the TRC and my own experiences of working for the TRC to explore the implications of im-
porting international transitional justice mechanisms into the local Solomon Islands context, and to draw attention to the cultural limitations of truth-telling. I 
argue that in order for peacebuilding tools to be effective in Solomon Islands, a strong commitment to, and understanding of, local context is required; transi-
tional justice mechanisms must resonate with local understandings and practices of conflict resolution and peacemaking. The TRC has the potential to play a 
positive role in building peace in Solomon Islands if it is viewed as a component of an ongoing process. Truth and memory alone will not bring about justice, 
reconciliation or peace; the memories and truths that are collected and produced by the TRC ought to be used for future action, addressing ongoing injustices 
and grievances.
In February 2012, the five-volume final report of the Solo-
mon Islands Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
was presented to Prime Minister Gordon Darcy Lilo. He 
congratulated the Commission on the completion of its 
mandate, saying that “it marks the closure of an important 
chapter to a long process of reconciliation and truth seek-
ing” (Island Sun 2012). Thirteen months after receiving the 
report, Lilo had not yet tabled it in parliament or released 
it to the public, as required by Section 17 of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Act 2008.1 Instead he defied 
repeated calls for the report’s release and announced a 
further six-month delay. Referring to the report’s “sensi-
tivity”, he argued: “we do not want to rush into releasing 
the report because we want to handle the issues in a 
responsible way” (Rakai 2013). In April 2013, Terry Brown, 
a retired Anglican bishop, Canadian national, long-time 
Solomon Islands resident and editor of the report, released 
an electronic copy to the Solomon Islands Christian 
Association (SICA), the churches’ peak body which had 
instigated the establishment of a TRC in 2000, as well as to 
social and mainstream media in Solomon Islands, to inter-
national newspapers and radio stations, and to a network 
of researchers. An electronic copy of the report (Ata et al. 
2012) also became available on the internet. Brown was 
highly critical of the government’s inaction:
It is not good enough to forgive the perpetrators and forget the 
victims, which seems to be the approach of the government. 
The report has not even been shared with the Ministry of 
National Reconciliation, Unity and Peace, which would have the 
primary responsibility for implementing it.
(cited in Callick 2013)
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The final report concluded over two years of research, 
exhumations, investigations and truth-seeking by the TRC. 
Along with recommendations for the Solomon Islands gov-
ernment about how best to address the legacy of the conflict 
which lasted from 1998 to 2003 (locally referred to as “the 
Tensions”), it includes detailed information about the 
antecedents of the conflict, its course, and the various 
parties engaged in it. The report also provides an analysis of 
human rights abuses, including murder, abduction, illegal 
detention, torture, sexual violence, property violation and 
forced displacement, and lists the names of two hundred 
people whose violent deaths were attributed to the Tensions. 
It draws on over 2,300 statements collected from across the 
country, and testimonies by victims, ex-combatants, politi-
cians and other leaders given at eleven public and 102 closed 
hearings. The Commission also considered numerous sub-
missions, a review of the relevant media coverage, academic 
literature and government documents and policies.
The literature on the recent Solomon Islands conflict 
focuses largely on the history, parties and events of the 
Tensions and the subsequent regional peace-keeping 
mission (Moore 2004; Fraenkel 2004; Allen and Dinnen 
2010; Allen 2013). While various UN agencies and NGOs 
have produced reports on development and peacebuilding 
in Solomon Islands more generally (for example, UNICEF 
2005; Oxfam 2006; UNDP 2004), and researchers have ana-
lysed women’s roles in the conflict and in peacebuilding 
(Pollard 2000; Paina 2000; Leslie and Boso 2003; Webber 
and Johnson 2008; Monson 2013), there is relatively little 
analysis of the peace process and the TRC (but see Braith-
waite et al. 2010; Maebuta and Spence 2009; Jeffery 2013; 
Harris Rimmer 2010).
This paper illustrates the complexities of implementing a 
TRC in a Melanesian context and contributes to the bur-
geoning discourse on peacebuilding and transitional justice 
in Solomon Islands. In heeding the call of many scholars 
working on issues of transitional justice to produce schol-
arship that is context specific, I have relied on two sets of 
data to inform my analysis and argument: First, I draw on 
my experiences, observations and reflections while working 
for the Solomon Islands TRC for one year, in 2011–2012, as 
a research officer assisting with the research on women’s 
experiences of the conflict and human rights abuses for the 
final report. Second, I draw on interviews with TRC staff 
and stakeholders.2 Many of the interviewees were imple-
menting TRC processes at the village and community level. 
As “translators” of human rights research and truth-seek-
ing, they mediated between global ideas of human rights 
and local sociocultural understandings (Merry 2006) and 
therefore experienced the problems and challenges of the 
TRC first-hand.
The Tensions in Solomon Islands are symptomatic of a glo-
bal trend since the end of the Cold War, namely, that con-
flicts occur increasingly within rather than between states. 
In many instances the relationships between the pro-
tagonists are intimate and complex. They share the same 
geographical territory, and are often linked through mar-
riage and other social and economic ties. It is therefore 
often not feasible to separate warring parties by drawing 
boundaries (Assefa 2001, 339). In these circumstances, 
conventional conflict management strategies are inad-
equate and transitional justice mechanisms, including 
truth commissions, offer a seemingly attractive alternative. 
To date, there have been over forty truth commissions 
globally. In many cases, earlier commissions have served as 
templates for later iterations with the result that a set of 
international, globalised norms have developed around 
their implementation. The commissions have been driven 
by a number of premises: that the process of recovering the 
truth will result in psychological healing, that there is no 
justice without truth, and that without knowledge of the 
past human rights violations will recur (Chirwa 1997, 479). 
As I argue in this paper, however, the links between truth 
and reconciliation on the one side and justice on the other 
can be tenuous, particularly when these concepts have a 
different meaning in the cultural setting in which the truth 
commission operates.
2 Interviews were conducted in English, Pijin, or a 
combination of both. All translations by the author. 
Interviewees included statement takers, data entry 
staff, researchers, exhumations officers, office man-
agers, administrative officers, Commissioners, as 
well as United Nations and NGO personnel who 
worked closely with the TRC. All interviews cited in 
this paper were conducted in 2012 in Honiara.
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This paper discusses the friction caused by importing glo-
bal ideas into local contexts, and explores the cultural limi-
tations of truth-telling. It argues that in a Melanesian 
context the effectiveness of a TRC depends on whether or 
not it can work within local cultural practices of memory, 
truth, justice and reconciliation. While I contend that many 
elements of TRCs are incongruent with a Melanesian post-
conflict context, I conclude that a TRC can play a positive 
role for building peace in Solomon Islands. To do so, it 
must respect local culture and kastom, and be viewed and 
operated as an ongoing process, where memory and truth 
are used for future action to address enduring injustices 
and grievances. These include the grievances that were the 
root causes of the conflict, and those that were its con-
sequences.
1. The Historical and Cultural Context
Solomon Islands consists of almost one thousand islands 
in the southwest Pacific. Like that of neighbouring Papua 
New Guinea and Vanuatu, the population of Solomon 
Islands is predominantly Melanesian. The country is eth-
nically and linguistically diverse: its population of just 
over half a million speak around eighty languages. How-
ever, Solomon Islanders share Pijin as a lingua franca. 
They live across nine provinces and the capital Honiara. 
Approximately 85 per cent of the population reside in 
rural areas on customary-owned land (Allen and Dinnen 
2010, 303).
The Solomon Islands became a British Protectorate in 
1893, and the dual processes of colonisation and mission-
ary work saw government, capitalism and Christianity 
spread across the islands, although with uneven rates of 
penetration and influence (Allen and Dinnen 2010, 303). 
While colonial boundaries have defined the Solomon 
Islands as a nation-state, personal identities and communal 
ties have remained strongest within local kinship groups, as 
argued by Moore:
[T]he provinces are no more “natural” to the islands than the 
unity imposed by the British as a protectorate in the 1890s – the 
“nation” is thus a collection of villages, descent groups and lan-
guage groups, all of which have thoroughly local agendas.
(Moore 2004, 158)
Today the state is peripheral to the lives of most Solomon 
Islanders, who practice subsistence agriculture and live in 
rural areas (Braithwaite et al. 2010, 13). Christianity, in 
contrast, has had a significant unifying impact.
The social norms and local-level systems governing conflict 
and reconciliation in Solomon Islands are rooted in cul-
ture, Christianity and kastom. A recent World Bank report 
for the Justice Delivered Locally project found that in local-
level disputes, the kastom system was “by far the most com-
monly invoked” (Allen et al. 2013, 34). Kastom is a Pijin 
term (derived from the English “custom”) that is widely 
used across the Solomon Islands. The term has no defini-
tion in Solomon Islands legislation and its meaning is 
highly subjective, as it has “taken on specific historical, 
political and place-based meanings” (Allen et al. 2013, 6). 
Broadly defined, kastom encompasses indigenous ideo-
logies, relationship to and management of land, moral 
frameworks, dispute management, gender relations and 
social organisation (White 1993, 492). These ideologies and 
activities serve to empower indigenous traditions and prac-
tices, both within communities and vis-à-vis the state and 
Western institutions (Akin 2004, 300). Although often 
associated with the past or tradition, kastom is fluid and 
evolving, existing alongside and in interplay with formal 
state structures and Christianity (Brown 2008, 190; Allen et 
al. 2013, 34).
In Melanesia, kastom and community practices, entwined 
in social, cultural, political, economic and spiritual dimen-
sions, play a major role in establishing boundaries for 
socially destructive behaviour and underpin patterns of 
collective identity and order (Brown 2008, 202). Clive 
Moore observes that: “Solomon Islanders recognise com-
plex symbolic links between human relationships, lands, 
gardens, music, dance, everyday thoughts, speech, their 
ancestors, and now Christianity, but this cosmological bal-
ance is fragile and rather like living comfortably in the vor-
tex of a cyclone” (2004, 216). While confrontation is 
usually avoided, when it does occur, “there needs to be a 
final ceremonial compensation and forgiveness to re-estab-
lish societal equilibrium” (219). This idea was often 
emphasised by my interviewees; one TRC research officer 
told me:
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These reconciliation processes usually include an exchange 
of traditional items of wealth, such as shell money or 
feather money, pigs and taro, as well as currency. Local 
understandings of reconciliation are centred around this 
primarily inter-personal, inter-familial and inter-com-
munal process focused on restoring relationships.
2. The Tensions
Although often referred to as an “ethnic conflict” or “eth-
nic tensions”, the 1998–2003 Solomon Islands conflict has 
its roots in socio-economic, development and land matters 
rather than in an intractable divide between the groups 
involved (Kabutaulaka 2002, 4; Maebuta and Spence 2009, 
7). The Tensions were primarily a conflict between militant 
groups representing people from the two largest and most 
populous islands, Guadalcanal and Malaita. The devel-
opment of Guadalcanal and migration to the island, along 
with the move of the capital from the island of Tulagi to 
Honiara on Guadalcanal after the Second World War, fos-
tered resentment amongst the people of Guadalcanal who 
came to view Malaitans as disrespectful guests on their 
land (Braithwaite et al. 2010, 18–19). As grievances went 
unaddressed, resentment grew.
In 1998, a group of Guadalcanal men formed the Guad-
alcanal Revolutionary Army, later called the Isatabu Free-
dom Movement (IFM), and began to evict and harass 
Malaitan settlers in rural parts of the island (Braithwaite et 
al. 2010, 23). Another militant group, the Malaita Eagle 
Force (MEF), retaliated. With the assistance of Malaitans in 
the police force, the MEF on 5 June 2000 captured the 
main police armoury and forced a change of government. 
Thousands of Malaitans who lived in rural Guadalcanal 
fled to Honiara or Malaita, and many indigenous Guad-
alcanal people fled the Malaitan-dominated capital to 
safety in their home villages. Thousands of settlers from 
other islands who were resident in Honiara or Guadalcanal 
returned temporarily to their respective home provinces. In 
October 2000, representatives of the warring groups signed 
the Townsville Peace Agreement. However a prominent 
IFM leader, Harold Keke, boycotted the Townsville meet-
ing. He and his supporters formed the Guadalcanal Liber-
ation Front, and continued to exert violent control over the 
remote Weathercoast of Guadalcanal. The police, aided by 
some ex-MEF and ex-IFM militants, tried to capture Keke 
and his men, but in the process also terrorised local vil-
lagers.
During the five-year conflict, the country as a whole was 
affected and particular hot spots saw an escalation of 
crime, violence, mass displacement, heightened insecurity 
and the proliferation of high-powered weapons. Almost 10 
per cent of the country’s population, most of them from 
rural Guadalcanal and Honiara, were displaced as a result 
of the violence. Government-run essential services were 
severely disrupted or ceased altogether as the economy col-
lapsed (Allen 2006, 310). A 2005 assessment by the United 
Nations Children’s Fund UNICEF found that “it is difficult 
to overstate the psychosocial impact of this trauma on the 
people of Solomon Islands”, and that the experience of 
trauma was not confined to immediate victims or dis-
placed people, but extended to Solomon Islanders through-
out the country who experienced a severe undermining of 
their sense of personal security and their confidence in the 
future (2005, 19).
The unprecedented level of violence, the proliferation of 
high-powered weapons and the widespread participation in 
conflict in the affected areas provided a challenge to local 
conflict management and reconciliation practices. The gov-
ernment attempted to draw on kastom in its effort to bring 
about reconciliation, but these attempts did not garner 
community support or ownership, or resemble traditional 
customary practices “wherein the symbolic rather than the 
material aspect is of tantamount importance” (Pollard and 
Wale 2004, 589). Within an hour of a government-funded 
public reconciliation feast in Honiara in 1999, during 
which leaders dressed in traditional outfits exchanged shell 
money and pigs, new violence reportedly broke out on the 
Guadalcanal plains (Maebuta and Spence 2009, 15). A 
The understanding of people in the village, if they say reconcili-
ation, there will be two parties, and there will be a symbolic 
exchange of maybe goods and money. Which symbolises that 
you’re sorry and things like that. Not necessarily repaying 
everything […] It symbolises understanding that a problem has 
happened, and we forget it. It should be addressed. And then, 
don’t do it again […] If there’s any problem next time, it will 
mean it’s a different problem.
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 government-funded system of compensation almost bank-
rupted the state, with millions paid for fraudulent claims 
and bribes for disarmament (Braithwaite et al. 2010, 47).
In July 2003, the Australian-led Regional Assistance 
Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) arrived in 
Honiara at the invitation of the Solomon Islands govern-
ment. Supported by the Pacific Islands Forum, RAMSI was 
mandated to restore law and order in a mission called 
Operation Helpem Fren. The mission centred on three core 
pillars for recovery: machinery of government, economic 
governance, and law and justice. The mission’s efforts to 
restore law and order included the removal of weapons, 
criminal prosecutions, institutional strengthening and 
capacity-building. Substantial resources and support for 
the “tension trials” resulted in a significant number of 
arrests and prosecutions, which made the case of the Solo-
mon Islands unusual in comparison with other post-con-
flict contexts (Jeffrey 2013, 11). Matthew Allen and Sinclair 
Dinnen question if RAMSI’s “haste to arrest, prosecute, 
liberalise and state-build” allowed sufficient space for 
indigenous methods of peace-making (2010, 323). While 
RAMSI has been heralded as a successful regional inter-
vention, it did not facilitate reconciliation, and many of the 
root causes of the conflict remained.
3. The Solomon Islands Truth and Reconciliation Commission
A TRC was first proposed in 2000, at the height of the Ten-
sions, by the SICA Peace Committee, which saw it as a 
potential means to “build national unity” through truth-
telling, reconciliation, and justice or amnesty processes 
(SICA 2002, 6). At the time, SICA considered a TRC to be a 
possible means to halt the ongoing violence and hostilities. 
Although SICA conducted initial research and con-
sultations to gauge community perceptions of a TRC, with 
the arrival of RAMSI and its law and order agenda, 
momentum for a TRC stalled. Without the backing of 
RAMSI, reconciliation was “crowded off” the policy agenda 
(Braithwaite et al. 2010, 81).
A change of government in 2006 saw reconciliation put on 
the policy agenda, and priority given to instruments 
designed to rebuild peace in the country. In 2008, parlia-
ment passed the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act, 
and in 2009 the Commission was officially launched by 
Desmond Tutu. When the TRC officially began its oper-
ations in 2010, RAMSI had been present in the country for 
over six years. With the tension trials mostly complete, the 
TRC was uniquely geared towards nation-building rather 
than accountability (Harris Rimmer 2010, 2); in fact, 
according to the Act, the Commission was not intended to 
affect criminal proceedings (articles 7 and 20), but its 
object was “to promote national unity and reconciliation” 
(article 5.1). Sofia Macher, the Commission’s deputy chair, 
explained in 2009 that the TRC was above all to facilitate a 
“consensual collective memory” of the past (cited in 
Hayner 2011, 71).
Initial planning documents of the Solomon Islands TRC 
stressed the importance of reflecting the country’s “unique 
situation” (MNURP 2008, 13) and of “looking into devel-
oping sensitivities to traditional and grassroots practices 
and build these to achieve meaningful post-conflict recon-
struction that is sustainable” (14). While public con-
sultations in anticipation of the TRC received a positive 
response, these were conducted in 2002–2003, prior to and 
just after RAMSI’s arrival, while the conflict was continu-
ing and the parties to the conflict had not yet been dis-
armed. The format of the TRC was not widely debated, and 
once it was officially introduced, its establishment and 
implementation were rushed. With the benefit of hind-
sight, there are many modifications that could have been 
made to its design to adapt it to local conditions. For 
example, the very act of asking about the conflict was 
largely incongruent with local kastom, as a statement taker 
explained to me:
Actually, statement taking contradicts some of our culture in 
Solomon Islands […] Here, what you find is that anything in the 
past from a long time ago, people like to forget and don’t want to 
talk about it. They’ll say, “Oh, it’s finished”. In the area I worked 
in, I found that the statement takers always came across a chal-
lenge where the people say “what are you doing with what we tell 
you?” Because it’s part of their tradition and culture where if you 
would like to talk about something which they have forgotten 
you have to put in place something. Traditionally you would use 
pigs or money, we call it a chupu [a form of compensation in 
Guadalcanal]. You must do that before you ask questions from a 
long time ago. So it’s really contradicting our people, to go and 
dig and talk about something that’s already past.
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Indeed, while there was local demand for the TRC, the 
truth commission model reflected an approach to recon-
ciliation that is incongruent with Solomon Islands cul-
tures. The TRC was initiated locally and implemented 
through an act of parliament. The overwhelming majority 
of the staff were Solomon Islanders. Yet the transitional 
justice discourse from which the idea of a TRC emerged 
was foreign to the country. The Commission was mostly 
funded by international and regional organisations, 
namely the European Union, the United Nations Devel-
opment Program (UNDP), and the Australian and New 
Zealand governments’ foreign aid agencies, the Australian 
Agency for International Development (AusAID) and the 
New Zealand Agency for International Development 
(NZAID). The organisational structure and reporting sys-
tems of the TRC reflected Western forms of governance. Its 
agenda was underpinned by Christian and external notions 
of peace and reconciliation, with little more than a token 
commitment to kastom and indigenous reconciliation 
practices.
4. Reconciliation in Local Context
In Solomon Islands kastom, reconciliation refers to a pro-
cess whereby the ongoing ramifications of conflict, such 
as retribution or payback, are extinguished so that rela-
tionships can be restored. Reconciliation and com-
pensation are inseparable when brokering peace, as 
compensation is aimed at stopping the conflict to allow 
reconciliation to occur (Maebuta and Spence 2009, 15). 
The payment of compensation is not an admission of 
guilt, nor a monetary compensation equivalent to the loss 
or damage done, but an acknowledgment that the 
aggrieved party was wronged. The person who provides 
the compensation may not be the wrongdoer, but could 
be a representative (such as a father, uncle or chief) who 
can help rectify the situation for the aggrieved party. 
Often the aggrieved party will provide something in 
return to indicate acceptance and reconciliation, and the 
gifts will be distributed within the family and community 
to signify a resolution.
After a matter has been dealt with in this way, the wrong 
usually cannot be spoken of again publicly, nor can it be 
used to justify any retribution or payback. While reconcili-
ation induces public silence about the matter, this does not 
mean it has been forgiven or forgotten, nor that justice (as 
understood locally) has been neglected. It is a pragmatic 
approach that allows those involved in the conflict to 
move on, and facilitates the “restoration of balance in 
order to ensure the sustainability of the society” (Ginty 
2008, 148). The parties involved might not necessarily 
become friends, but they are once more able to co-exist 
peacefully.3
In a local context where the term “reconciliation” refers to 
fairly specific processes of exchange, its use in the title of 
the TRC suggested to Solomon Islanders that the Commis-
sion would facilitate compensation or reconciliation pro-
cesses as understood locally. Statement takers and TRC 
researchers frequently mentioned how communities were 
unaware and suspicious of the TRC’s purpose, aims and 
mandate. In impromptu community meetings hosted on 
arrival of the statement takers, a common question asked 
was: “What will you do with our stories?” One statement 
taker told me:
The men ask lots of questions. What are you [the TRC] going to 
do after this? What is the government going to do for us? It’s no 
good if you come and waste our time to take our stories and 
then you all benefit from what we’ve given you.
Although the TRC acted independently from the govern-
ment, many Solomon Islanders perceived it as an arm of 
the state – which had been a party to the conflict. They felt 
they had been wronged by the state and were therefore 
entitled to compensation from the state. Many villagers 
expressed anger and frustration at statement takers, 
because they supposedly made money from collecting 
stories of suffering. One TRC researcher told me how one 
chief said to him angrily: “You, the government pays you. 
Us, the government doesn’t pay us.” One interviewee said 
that the state was only interested in people’s lives outside of 
3 I would like to thank Bishop Terry Brown for a 
stimulating discussion about reconciliation and 
compensation.
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Honiara when it wanted to extract something, be it 
resources, knowledge or, in this case, stories.
In order to encourage Solomon Islanders to participate in 
the truth-seeking activities, staff explained that the TRC 
would compile a final report, including recommendations 
for future policy and reforms, and provide it to the govern-
ment. Many Solomon Islanders would not have par-
ticipated in the process if they had not thought that by 
giving statements to the TRC they were contributing to an 
exchange, and that they would therefore in turn be the 
beneficiaries of government policies that addressed the 
issues raised in their stories of conflict and suffering. 
Arguably, the legislation that created the basis for the TRC 
provided for such an exchange.4
5. Cultural Limitations of Truth-telling
Truth-telling and truth-seeking are increasingly viewed as 
essential components of contemporary peacebuilding. 
However, whether the reliance on both components is jus-
tified is a matter of debate (Mendeloff 2004; Tepperman 
2002). David Mendeloff considers the range of claims for 
peacebuilding made by advocates of truth-telling and con-
cludes that they “rest far more on faith than on sound logic 
or empirical evidence” (2004, 356). Truth-seeking is often 
represented as vital for peacebuilding, through the meta-
phor of cleaning a wound to allow it to heal and avoid 
infection (Hayner 2011, 145), however “it remains unclear 
how significant it is” (Mendeloff 2004, 356). At the official 
opening of the Solomon Islands TRC, Desmond Tutu said: 
“to achieve lasting peace requires courage […] what you 
are doing is opening old wounds and applying a new 
potent medicine that would heal the wound” (Solomon 
Times 2010). The Chair of the TRC, Father Sam Ata, 
echoed this sentiment many times, saying for example, 
“definitely it will open old wounds, it’s good to deal with 
those old wounds and get them healed” (Australia Network 
News 2010). While the imagery is effective and the deal 
promising, the relationship between truth-telling and 
peacebuilding is elusive: the assumptions underlying the 
purported benefits of truth-seeking may not hold in a Mel-
anesian context.
On the positive side, many interviewees agreed that docu-
mentation of the truth was a worthwhile outcome of the 
TRC. While there was no widespread policy of secrecy or 
suppression of information during the Tensions, the his-
tory of the conflict is not widely known. This is due to a 
range of factors, including the Solomon Islands’ ethnic 
diversity, the isolation of some of the most affected com-
munities, the fear instilled in many victims, and cultural 
practices of shame and silence that may prohibit the dis-
closure of crimes such as sexual violence. There remains 
widespread confusion about how and why the conflict 
started, and about its root causes. Although documenting 
the historical narrative was considered a constructive out-
come, the potential benefit it offers depends on both how 
the information is sourced and how it is utilised.
In contrast to this positive view of truth-seeking, statement 
takers frequently considered truth-telling incompatible 
with local kastom. One statement taker from Guadalcanal 
likened statement taking to asimabulu, a vernacular term 
that refers to talking about serious matters from the past 
(such as death), or literally, digging up rotten and smelly 
things, and implied that kastom must be followed if this is 
to be done sensitively and appropriately:
So if you want to do this asimabulu, you must do “red money” 
[shell money of traditional value often used in kastom and as 
compensation] to revive the case. For the TRC, in Guadalcanal, 
this is what we are doing – we are doing asimabulu. And people 
are only willing to participate because they are looking forward 
to the reparation [from the government].
(Interview with TRC statement taker)
Opening the wound, or digging up the past, without 
respecting cultural protocols risks causing offence and dis-
turbing the tentative peace that has been achieved thus far. 
4 According to Article 16 of the Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission Act 2008, a report must be sub-
mitted to the prime minister once the Commission 
has made recommendations concerning the 
measures needed to achieve its object “of providing 
an impartial historical record, preventing the repeti-
tion of the violations or abuses suffered, addressing 
impunity, responding to the needs of victims and 
promoting healing and reconciliation.” Article 17 
stipulates that upon receiving the report, the prime 
minister must table it in parliament and that it must 
be made available to the public. The Act obliges the 
government to implement the report’s recom-
mendations “as far as practicable”.
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It is important that culture is respected, kastom is followed, 
and the truth is used as a means to an end, to secure recon-
ciliation or to provide evidence in support of the TRC’s 
recommendations. There is little value in truth as an end in 
itself for the purpose of reconciliation.
Silence and testimony both carry risks in post-conflict con-
texts (Shaw and Waldorf 2010, 14). In post-conflict Solo-
mon Islands, villagers often chose to avoid confrontation, 
maintain relationships, and ensure security and safety. 
Women often chose to remain silent for cultural and prag-
matic reasons. Writing about women and the South Afri-
can TRC, Fiona Ross explains how such silence can be a 
sign of courage:
In contexts in which women are often blamed for the harm they 
experience, especially when that harm is sexual, it ought not be 
surprising that many would prefer not to speak, or find them-
selves unable to do so, particularly when doing so incriminates 
not just another individual, but a set of cultural assumptions 
and the social forms that they shape. It takes courage both to 
speak of harms done and to be silent in their face and aftermath.
(Ross 2010, 81)
This sentiment was also echoed in the joint women’s sub-
mission to the Solomon Islands TRC: “[F]or women, 
sometimes their silence is louder, stronger, and safer than 
anything they say out loud because of the risks involved in 
telling their stories” (Fangalasuu et al. 2011, 13). In Solo-
mon Islands, strong cultural taboos limit women’s ability 
to discuss rape or sexual experiences. Doing so would 
contravene cultural practices and risk further violence, 
shame or other repercussions. The women’s submission 
suggests that “truth-telling often separates families, com-
munities, and individuals. This is why so often truth is stra-
tegically concealed” (Fangalasuu et al. 2011, 13). The 
cultural impetus for choosing silence is heightened by the 
very tangible issue of physical safety and security. A report 
on truth commissions by the UN Office of the High Com-
missioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) suggests that state-
ment taking be designed to allow victims to recount their 
experiences in a supportive and safe environment (2006, 
17). In small and highly networked societies, such as Solo-
mon Islands, where anonymity is virtually impossible, vil-
lages are very public spaces, and ensuring privacy and a 
“supportive and safe environment” is extremely difficult. 
For example, along the Weathercoast of Guadalcanal, a hot 
spot of the conflict, villages are densely populated with 
houses built close to one another. Efforts to ensure privacy 
involved finding a private verandah or similar location, and 
talking in hushed tones. Even so, community members 
could easily identify who had spoken to the TRC.
Proponents of truth-telling draw on Western psychothera-
peutic models to suggest that TRCs are cathartic for par-
ticipants: “[S]imply giving victims and witnesses a chance 
to tell their stories to an official commission […] can help 
them regain their dignity and begin to recover” (Hayner 
2011, 146). As Priscilla Hayner points out, truth commis-
sions offer victims not long-term therapy but a one-time 
opportunity to tell their story (2011, 147); this is a starkly 
different process from that involving a therapist and 
patient (Mendeloff 2004, 363–65). Not only are formal 
therapy and testifying different processes, but arguably 
neither is cathartic in Melanesia. The model of cathartic 
truth-telling is embedded in Western culture, shaped by 
principles of psychotherapy. Fiona Ross highlights its limi-
tations, arguing in the South African context that “it is not 
necessarily a universal or transhistorical model and does 
not take account of the diversity of ways in which experi-
ence is articulated or otherwise made known and 
addressed” (2010, 82). In Solomon Islands, many statement 
takers encountered resistance to the cathartic under-
standing of truth-telling; as one noted: “This idea that 
people can tell their stories and then they feel free […] I 
think in Melanesian culture, that doesn’t really work. 
Unless there is some kind of compensation. Most people 
did not want to give their statement.”
The TRC attempted to provide psychological support to 
those who testified at public hearings. It paid for their 
accommodation in Honiara for up to a month to prepare 
for, and debrief from, testifying, and provided a counsell-
ing service. Ongoing support was not offered, however, and 
counselling was only available to those who testified at 
public hearings. While the effort to offer counselling in a 
country with almost no psychological services was com-
mendable, it was premised on a foreign understanding of 
psychosocial support. In Solomon Islands, formal 
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 psychological counselling may not be culturally appropri-
ate. Instead, as in many societies globally, the ideal source 
of support may be community organisations, churches, 
traditional healers, or extended family and friends (Hayner 
2011, 157).
In Solomon Islands, personal and political spheres are 
intertwined, and many TRC staff members and stake-
holders expressed concern that their personal reputations 
had been damaged. One statement taker told me:
In the community where I come from, they say the TRC is a fail-
ure, and that those of us who worked at the TRC are con men. 
Even now when I come across people who I met during state-
ment taking, they ask me, “When will something happen?” And 
I don’t know what to tell them […] So when I get called a con 
man, I don’t feel good. But it’s beyond my capacity. So if I meet a 
boss of the TRC on the street, I try and ask them about the prog-
ress of the TRC. And they say that the report has been submitted 
to parliament and they don’t know what will happen now.
Many were embarrassed or hesitant to revisit villages where 
they had collected testimonies for the TRC. Statement 
takers talked about the personal responsibility they felt 
towards those who provided statements in the under-
standing that the government would consider the final 
report and act on its recommendations.
6. Realising the Potential of the Solomon Islands TRC
Local memory practices and culturally embedded practices 
of managing conflict and wrong-doings are entrenched in 
community life and kastom. The Tensions, however, pro-
vided a new challenge to dispute management, justice 
mechanisms and peacebuilding practices. There were some 
successful, localised efforts to build peace, for example by 
Women for Peace (Pollard 2000; Paina 2000) and local 
church organisations such as the Melanesian Brotherhood 
(Maebuta and Spence 2009, 23–29). However, attempts to 
formalise traditional reconciliation were corrupted and 
manipulated because the indigenous approach to manag-
ing conflict was inverted: compensation was offered as an 
incentive for peace rather than a genuine exchange for rec-
onciliation (Maebuta and Spence 2009, 15). This led to a 
monetisation of the reconciliation process and fraudulent 
claims to, and corruption of, compensation payments 
(Fraenkel 2004).
Some ideas which underpin the common TRC model fit 
well with Melanesian cultures. These include conducting a 
process dedicated to reconciliation, bringing people 
together to share stories, and promoting healing and resto-
ration of balance in communities. Other ideas, particularly 
the cathartic value of truth-telling, are not compatible, and 
are potentially detrimental to the goals of peacebuilding. A 
TRC is capable of facilitating reconciliation both at the 
national and the local level. At the national level, the provi-
sion of testimony in exchange for the implementation of 
government recommendations potentially accords with a 
Melanesian style of conflict management whereby symbolic 
restitution is made in recognition of harm suffered. 
Depending on how the government responds to the final 
report, this may still happen. At the local level, the most 
important context for reconciliation in Solomon Islands is 
individuals, families and communities. Ceremonies between 
political leaders or chiefs will not restore the inter-personal 
relationships between those who harmed each other during 
the conflict. On the other hand, providing spaces for vic-
tims, ex-militants, and others involved in conflict to talk 
about or document their experiences, and bringing people 
together under the banner of reconciliation, has enormous 
potential benefits in the Solomon Islands context.
The TRC’s use of the term “reconciliation” required clarifi-
cation. Who were the intended beneficiaries of the pro-
posed reconciliation, and who was to be reconciled? In 
Melanesia, reconciliation refers to an inter-personal process 
between individuals, families or communities involved in a 
dispute. The Solomon Islands TRC, however, did not initi-
ate or host processes of inter-personal reconciliation 
between those involved in disputes, although in the minds 
of many Solomon Islanders who worked for the TRC, this 
was how reconciliation should have occurred. One senior 
TRC staff member told me:
The TRC never came up with a plan on how they could estab-
lish a process of reconciliation […] In my view it would be 
based on what exists here. Kastom reconciliation, some ideas 
from there, and also the church. You could bring the two 
together and work something out from both.
Talking about past conflict or matters that have been rec-
onciled is generally taboo unless it is accompanied by 
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 certain social protocols or kastom. Therefore the strength 
of a TRC in Solomon Islands as a tool for peacebuilding on 
a national level does not lie in cathartic story-telling, fur-
nishing a historical narrative of the conflict or docu-
menting human rights abuses, but rather in the potential 
for sanctioning discussions under the banner of reconcili-
ation on an inter-personal level, and the linkages with 
action and justice that the final report potentially offers at a 
national level. From the outset, those advocating for a TRC 
were aware that recommendations alone were not enough:
From the experiences of other transitional societies, it is critical 
to the long term success of the peace process that the recom-
mendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission be 
mandatory on the government for implementation.
(SICA 2002, 4)
In Solomon Islands, reconciliation entails a commitment 
to action, process and symbolic restitution for the victim 
and their family and community. Action usually 
encompasses a combination of meetings, talks, feasts and 
the exchange of compensation. This local conception of 
reconciliation offers potential space for instruments such 
as truth commissions; as one TRC manager put it: “Truth-
telling can be beneficial in certain circumstances. It can 
initiate a process maybe, but it depends much more on 
what comes after.”
7. Conclusion
Memory and justice practices in Solomon Islands do not 
allow for a sharp line to be drawn between the past and the 
future in the name of transitional justice or nation-build-
ing. Local memory and justice practices are instead a pro-
cess of ongoing, culturally embedded memes, which may 
include the state, the churches or kastom, to satisfy the 
needs of all participants in the conflict. Once each rift has 
been healed, it earns silence; although not forgotten, the 
wrongdoing is not to be used to justify further retribution 
or payback.
With a broad and ambitious mandate to “promote national 
unity and reconciliation”, and a title that gestured towards 
both truth and reconciliation without defining either, the 
Solomon Islands TRC began with expectations that could 
never be met. Yet if, as James McAdams posits, TRCs and 
transitional justice are viewed as “a process in which the 
outcome is uncertain but the undertaking is valued in 
itself” (2011, 312), then there is potential for peacebuilding. 
While sharing stories, memory and truth are key com-
ponents of truth commissions and reconciliation, “healing 
depends to a significant extent on how we respond to those 
stories” (Charles Villa-Vicencio, cited in Andrews 2003, 47).
The official acknowledgement of the final report and a 
government commitment to implementing the TRC’s rec-
ommendations were integral to the public’s participation 
and its effectiveness as a peacebuilding tool. Justice and 
memory practices involve “reconstructing the world of the 
living” (Kent 2011, 444). The TRC’s programs were an 
opportunity for those affected by the conflict to exhibit the 
presence of the past in the present, and lobby for repar-
ation and recognition of the effects of ongoing injustices.
The TRC was a means through which the government 
could fulfil its obligations as party to an exchange, 
acknowledge the stories shared with the Commission, and 
offer compensation to restore the pre-conflict balance in 
the communities. Compensation, in this regard, could take 
the form of reparations as recommended in the final 
report, exhumations, memorials, rehabilitation or institu-
tional reforms. Not releasing the report or enacting its rec-
ommendations risks dishonouring those who have 
participated in the process, many of whom already feel that 
they suffered an injustice at the hands of the state during 
the conflict.
When truth commissions and transitional justice are oper-
ated as local, open-ended, indigenous processes, rather 
than geared towards a specific outcome, they can be con-
gruent with Melanesian beliefs. As a process-oriented 
mechanism, the TRC would be judged not on whether it 
achieves truth or reconciliation, but whether it can create 
the space for this to occur in a way that is organic to the 
context – a dynamic, modern Pacific society with cultural 
traditions that involve Christianity and kastom as well as 
institutions of the state. Otherwise, the search for truth and 
justice will be far less satisfying than people hope and the 
seductive discourse of transitional justice will serve only to 
raise impossible expectations.
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